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The aim of this article is to examine the impact of informal governance on democratic 
legitimacy. It draws on the literatures on informal governance and decentred theory to examine 
how governance mechanisms that are un-written, un-codified and non-institutional impact on 
democratic legitimacy in governance networks. Drawing on a case study of English devolution 
in the United Kingdom, this article explores how informal governance impacts on different 
dimensions of legitimacy - input, throughout and output. It does so by drawing on the narratives 
and stories of central government officials directly involved in English devolution between 
2015 and 2018. Findings reveal that even when formal structures are weak, democratic 
legitimacy can be secured, especially in promoting effective decision making and problem 
solving - throughput legitimacy. Nonetheless, a decentred analysis has shown a high level of 
selectivity and differentiation in central-local relationships that undermines legitimation based 
on input (inclusiveness) and outcome (results) legitimacy. This assessment provides important 
new insights into how governance networks characterized by high levels of informality can 
promote democratic legitimacy in ways that reflect the nuances of political decision making in 
highly complex environments. The challenge for politicians and policy makers moving forward 
is to actively manage the inevitable trade-offs generated through the use of informality if 




The issue of informality in policy making is particularly timely as actors from state, market 
and civil society work together to manage complex problems within contested environments 
(Turnbull, 2018). This has prompted a growing interest in questions about democratic 
legitimacy in governance networks (Sorensen, 2016). Reflecting the subjectivity of the topic, 
a number of different definitions of informal governance are identified in the literature. This 
article takes the position of informality as the absence of written rules. Christiansen et al (2003: 
6), for example, define governance as informal ‘when participation in the decision making 
processes is not or cannot be codified and publicly enforced’. Informal governance includes, 
therefore, structures and processes that are un-codified, un-documented and have no trace 
beyond the recollection and perceptions of the actors involved. By contrast, formal governance 
‘is regulated by rules that have been instituted according to procedures recognized as legal in 
clearly defined contexts. Normally, formal rules are written down and recognized as binding 
on behavior under defined circumstances’ (Brie and Stolting, 2013, 19). Both types are evident 
in all political systems and may complement, support, impede or paralyze each other.  
 
Attention to informal institutions and processes is not new to political science. Nevertheless, 
informal governance has remained at the margins of this analysis. ‘Indeed, much current 
literature assumes that actors’ incentives and expectations are shaped, primarily, if not 
exclusively, by formal rules’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2013, 85). Such a narrow focus can be 
problematic, for it risks missing much of what drives policy making and underplays the social 
construction of political decision making. Informality is often recognized in the governance 
literature, but rarely holds center stage in empirical analysis (Peters, 2007). Indeed, because of 
the methodological challenges of analyzing the ‘invisible’, there is little empirical research on 
the role of informality in policy-making (Jitske et al, 2016). It is usually a by-product or add-
on to broader, more formal institutional analysis. Moreover, most work on informal governance 
has focused on policy making in the European Union (Kleine, 2013) and international 
organizations and ‘there is thus far a lacunae when it comes to observing and accounting for 
the practice of informal governance more generally across the globe and within different policy 
domains’ (Christiansen and Neuhold, 2013, 2). This article seeks to bridge this gap by moving 
beyond functionalist accounts to offer a rich, empirical analysis of how informality shapes one 
of the fundamental principles of contemporary policy making: democratic legitimacy. In doing 
so, it makes an original contribution to the informal governance literature by exploring this 
phenomenon at a national state level where there has been comparatively little empirical work.   
 
The impact of informal governance on democratic legitimacy will be examined through a case 
study of English devolution in the UK. This area of policy is highly suited to analyze the impact 
of informal governance on democratic legitimacy for the following reasons. First, English 
devolution involves actors from state, market and civil society operating at multi-governance 
levels. Second, the policy has attracted a lot of political attention via commitments to devolve 
powers and budgets to boost local growth in England (Lupton et al, 2018). However, there has 
been very little formal guidance shaping the scope and direction of the policy (Sandford, 2017). 
Third, informality is pertinent to English devolution as the Government has negotiated a range 
of ‘devolution deals’ with localities, each of which individually brokered. Finally, the policy 
has led to much criticism from academics (Prosser et al, 2017) and practitioners (DCLG, 2016) 
who have labelled the process secretive, exclusionary, undemocratic and lacking legitimacy. 
English devolution, therefore, provides a timely case study to explore the impact of informal 
governance on democratic legitimacy in a network where formal structures are weak.   
 
The analysis is from a central government perspective and is based on thirty-two in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews with senior Whitehall officials charged with negotiating and 
appraising the devolution deals between 2015 and 2018. This article is structured as follows. 
Part I outlines the literature review and theoretical framework. Part II provides a brief account 
of the English devolution policy context. Part III sets out the article’s methodological approach. 
Part IV presents the research findings. The article concludes by reflecting on how this body of 
evidence can be utilized to appraise the impact of informal governance based on three 
dimensions of legitimacy that account for the nuances of complex networks - input, throughput 
and output legitimacy (Kleine, 2018). The central argument of this article is that in an 
increasingly fragmented, fluid and informal policy landscape, scholars and policy makers need 
to think about democratic legitimacy in a more nuanced way. Traditional conceptions based on 
accountability and transparency may not be the only sources of legitimation. Informal 
governance offers fruitful avenues to enhance democratic legitimacy at a nation state level 
under certain circumstances. However, policy makers need to actively manage the inevitable 
trade-offs generated through the use of informality if accusations of a democratic deficit are to 




PART I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Governance networks and democratic legitimacy 
 
Over recent years there has been a growing interest in questions about democratic legitimacy 
in governance networks (Kort and Klijn, 2012). Networks are the result of a pragmatic search 
for means of effective and proactive governance. Yet, they cannot be legitimized merely by 
reference to their outputs. There needs to be some form of democratic control and 
accountability. Sorensen and Torfing (2018) argue that governance networks can have a 
democratizing effect by tying political leaders more closely to local stakeholders and citizens. 
They argue that governance networks, 
 
‘provide an essential ingredient in promoting integrative, participatory and deliberative 
forms of democracy as a supplement to aggregative, representative and majoritarian 
forms of democracy that frequently fail to meet citizens’ demands for more active and 
direct participation’ (ibid, 303). 
 
Governance networks are neither intrinsically undemocratic nor democratic. Their democratic 
credentials depend on their functioning and contextual environment. If they are to secure a 
democratizing effect they must have ‘anchorage’ in: 
• A commonly accepted grammar of democratic conduct, 
• A competent and critical citizenry capable of scrutinizing and judging the decision-
making process, 
• The represented constituencies affected by the policy, and 
• Elected politicians and government officials capable of steering the network (Torfing 
et al, 2012). 
 
These types of democratic anchorage do not, however, happen automatically. Stoker (2019), 
for example, makes a compelling argument that the focus in the governance paradigm on 
technical statecraft and problem solving has overlooked the need to ensure democratic 
anchorage, leading to a disillusioned public and a rise in populism. The transition to governance 
has, for example, raised citizens’ expectations about their potential involvement and the 
prospect of ‘doing democracy that break from the over-reliance on the traditional instruments 
of representative democracy’ (ibid, 6). However, the reality of networked governance often 
fails to meet this rhetoric. For Papadopoulos (2007, 470) the democratic ‘deficit mainly stems 
from four properties of network governance: the weak presence of citizen representatives in 
networks; the lack of visibility and uncoupling from the democratic circuit; the multilevel 
aspect; and the prevalence of “peer” forms of accountability’.  
 
Stoker (2019, 11) argues that populists can exploit each of these four properties and that ‘a lack 
of visibility provides a breeding ground for suspicion about governance arrangements’. In 
particular he argues that accountability ‘within networks is driven more by peer pressures and 
expressed through the building of trust within the network rather that the external form of 
accountability…to the people’ (p.12). Stoker argues that one should be wary of using policy 
efficiency as a justification for a failure to deliver democratic legitimacy:   
 
‘Arguing that important incremental gains can be made through innovative governance 
arrangements might pale in impact when met by claims of moral failure (profits before 
people), corruption (dodgy deals) and injustices (only the few benefit) in the lines of 
attack open to populists with respect to these governance practices’ (p. 13).  
 
This position raises a series of important questions about the use of informality in governance 
networks. Yet, there has been a dearth of empirically grounded research on the topic 
(Christiensen and Neuhold, 2013). This article seeks to bridge this gap by drawing on the 
literatures on informal governance (Kleine, 2018) and decentred theory (Bevir, 2013) as a 
theoretical framework.  
 
Informal governance and democratic legitimacy  
 
An increasingly important question in contemporary policy making is, can informal 
governance can ever be legitimate? One view is that informal governance will inevitably lead 
to negative traits such as exclusiveness, marginalization or illegality (Klinke, 2016). By 
contrast, Kleine (2018, 2) argues that, under certain circumstances, informal governance has 
the ‘capacity to stabilize the political order’ and can even ‘strengthen its legitimacy’. Drawing 
on a sociological perspective, Kleine distinguishes between: 
 
‘input, throughout and output legitimation mechanisms, with input referring to the 
participatory quality, throughput to the procedural quality, and output to the problem-
solving quality of a political order’ (2018, p. 7). 
 
Input legitimacy refers to a process ‘where the possibility of participating in the making of a 
rule and having one’s voice considered strengthens the belief in the appropriateness and 
bindingness of the resulting rule, independently of whether or not it reflects one’s interests’ 
(Kleine, 2018, 7). Inclusive participation is typically equated with the democratic process in 
which all citizens that are affected by a decision are either directly or indirectly represented in 
its decision making. Informality in governance networks can help in this regard by mobilizing 
resources and actors to ‘strengthen the weak institutional links between the political elites and 
citizens’ (Sorensen, 2016, 422). Nonetheless, informal working is often more prominent where 
the decision making context is uncertain, where the number of decision makers is potentially 
high and where conflict among negotiators is (or might become) intense (Mukherjee and Giest, 
2019). In these instances, informal governance can reduce the transaction costs of formal 
decision making by restricting the number of participants, thus providing a shortcut to reaching 
agreements but potentially undermining legitimacy through the marginalization of affected 
actors.  
 
Throughput legitimacy is concerned with the quality of the decision making process itself. For 
Kleine (2018, 9) it is also ‘the process of decision making that strengthens the belief in the 
appropriateness and bindingness of the resulting rule, independently of whether or not it 
reflects one's interests’. The first component of throughput legitimacy in systems of 
representative democracy is accountability, which implies that democratic bodies and the 
citizenry have the right to hold others to a set of standards, judge whether they have met those 
standards and to impose sanctions if the standards have not been met (Mabillard and Zumofen, 
2017). This might include, for example, an opportunity to question decision makers about their 
procedures or public scrutiny of decisions and outcomes (Sorensen and Torfing, 2018). A 
prerequisite of accountability in parliamentary democracies is transparency and this is where 
all forms of informal governance have a weakness. In mainstream democratic theory, 
democratic rule depends upon formal institutions where procedures are transparent and 
accountable, which legitimizes the policy process (Klike, 2016). By contrast, informal 
processes avoid accountability requirements - they are not officially coded, making it difficult 
to provide assurances of transparency, accountability and legitimacy. Informal governance 
might, however, be employed as a tool to complement formal institutional arrangements and 
rules - essentially ‘greasing the wheels’ of the formal bureaucracy. In these instances it could 
serve to enhance legitimacy by promoting efficiency. In their work exploring policy making in 
the EU, Christiansen et al (2003) acknowledge that informal governance can play a role in 
promoting creativity and innovation in the short term. However, they argue that without 
mechanisms of transparency and accountability, effective policy making is difficult to maintain 
over the longer term.  
 
A second component of throughput legitimacy is the quality of the decision making process. 
Proponents of deliberative democracy suggest ‘that processes that systematically allow for 
arguing, reason-giving and mutual learning rather than bargaining will have a substantially 
improved chance of leading to better outcomes’ (Kleine, 2018, 10). Informality can strengthen 
this process by acting as a tool to break down the barriers associated with differences in 
professional languages, values and objectives, thus promoting greater inclusion and diversity 
in policy making (Klijn, 2014). Helmke and Levitsky (2004) also argue that informal working 
can improve the problem-solving capacity and efficiency of institutions. For example, 
informality can help to manage complexity and uncertainty in complex networks and promote 
collaborative innovation (Sorensen et al, 2017).  
 
Output legitimacy is concerned with delivering results. ‘Citizens are believed to support a 
political order when it improves their situation, independent of whether or not they have been 
included in the decision or approve of the way in which it was taken’ (Kleine, 2018, 10). 
Indeed, given a lack of transparency and blurred lines of accountability in governance 
networks, it could make sense to focus on demonstrating legitimacy through a focus on 
outcomes. Informal working can serve to promote effectiveness in governance networks. For 
example, it can help to build interpersonal and inter-organizational trust, which has shown to 
be a valuable asset in achieving network objectives in devolved contexts (Morphet and 
Clifford, 2018). Indeed, if the network performs well the argument is made that informal 
structures and procedures can be defended as legitimate as they are in the best interests of the 
affected parties. Nonetheless, Stoker’s (2019) view above reminds one of the perils of this. 
 
This framework offers an appropriate way to explore the impact of informal governance on 
democratic legitimacy as it accounts for the nuances and political realities of complex networks 
(McConnell, 2018). However, this framework needs to be combined with an approach to 
capture informal practices in politically sensitive environments. This is where decentred theory 
(Bevir, 2013) makes a noteworthy a contribution.   
 
Decentred theory as a way to analyze the ‘informal’ 
 
Decentred offers a way to access the informal, day-to-day realities of policy making by a 
drawing on the subjective interpretations of subjects’ perceptions and beliefs in a particular 
context (Rhodes, 2011). Bevir (2013, 1) argues that,  
 
‘Decentered theory emphasizes the diversity of governing practices and the importance 
of historical explanations of these practices. Governance is seen as a set of diverse 
practices that people are constantly creating and recreating through their concrete 
activity. Governance is explained by the narratives that the relevant actors first inherit 
as historical traditions and then revise in response to dilemmas’. 
 
Decentred theory includes a preference for bottom-up forms of inquiry, accepts that people in 
the same social situation can hold different beliefs and seeks to explain governance by 
understanding the ways that actors interpret their environment and modify their actions in 
response. This makes it a highly suitable framework to explore the nuances of informal 
governance. The only way to explore it empirically is to speak to those individuals directly 
involvement about their perceptions and responses, which is what decentred theory advocates. 
 
To undertake decentred theory, Bevir and Rhodes (2016, 1) challenge scholars to ‘rethink 
governance’ as the outcome of different and competing traditions that inform contestable 
practices. They suggest that governance consists of ‘diverse practices of ruling, inspired by 
competing rationalities, and confronting plural forms of resistance: the 3Rs’ (ibid, 2). This 
article will examine the impact of informal governance on democratic legitimacy by exploring 
policy making through the ‘3Rs: ruling, rationalities and resistance’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2016, 
6).  
 
Ruling: Decentred theory suggests that social scientists should pay more attention to ‘the 
traditions, the backcloth, against which elites construct their world views’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 
2016, 7).  This backcloth or tradition can encompass features like a propensity for privatization 
(Raco, 2016) and concentration of elite power (Bradbury, 2016).  
 
Rationalities: Within the overarching historical traditions that shape political action rest wide 
variations across individual policy arenas. These rationalities vary across time, space and sector 
and can be conflicting. Rationalities ‘refer here to the social scientific beliefs and associated 
technologies that govern conduct’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2016, 10). Rationalities capture the ways 
in which governments and other social actors draw on knowledge to construct policies, actions 
and practices.  
 
Resistance: ‘Policies are sites of struggles not just between strategic elites but between all kinds 
of actors with different views and ideals, against the backdrop of different traditions’ (Bevir 
and Rhodes, 2016, 12). Competing historical traditions and rationalities can cause elites to 
resist one another. Moreover, subordinate actors can resist the intensions and policies of elites 
by consuming them in ways that draw on their local traditions and reasoning.  
 
The position taken here is that the literatures on informal governance and decentred theory are 
natural bedfellows. Both draw attention to the importance of situated actors in shaping public 
action. Decentred theory advocates social scientists listening to the narratives and stories of 
those they study to construct their own narratives ‘as an insightful way of analyzing 
governance’ (Bevir, 2013, 8). Likewise, the literature on informal governance argues that much 
can be learned about ways to improve policy by understanding what happens, based on the 
perceptions of actors involved (Ayres, 2019; 2017). These literatures complement one another 
to offer a highly suitable framework to analyze informal forms of governance and are, 
therefore, used to structure the findings section in Part III. The following section provides a 
brief overview of the policy context shaping English devolution.  
 
 
PART II. POLICY CONTEXT  
 
The UK is one of the most centralized countries of its size in the developed world and English 
local government has the most circumscribed powers of any equivalent tier internationally 
(Beer et al, 2019). Decentralization has the potential to boost economic growth, allow for 
variation and innovation in public services and enhance local democracy. Indeed, the recent 
drive towards localism has been framed as more than a simple rescaling of governance 
institutions. Buser (2013, 3) argues that is has presented a: 
 
‘re-conceptualization of citizen engagement in which individuals, the private sector and 
third sector groups are set to gain a variety of responsibilities for the management of 
civic space…At the fore of this re-conceptualization is the promise of civic 
empowerment and democratic renewal.   
 
All the main UK political parties recognize this possibility and have been good at making 
commitments to devolve power. Nonetheless, successive governments have found it hard to 
implement decentralizing reforms due to a complex set of historical, cultural and institutional 
barriers. This led Buser (2013, 3) to conclude that ‘major structural changes would be required 
to realize significant local government empowerment’. Elected in May 2015, the Conservative 
government set out ambitious plans in its Manifesto to achieve this transition (Conservative 
Party, 2015). That same document pledged to devolve ‘far-reaching powers over economic 
development, transport and social care to large cities which choose to have elected mayors’ 
(ibid, 1). The Government was swift to implement the Cities and Local Government Devolution 
Bill (DCLG and Home Office, 2015) to make good this pledge. This Bill is an enabling piece 
of legislation allowing the Government to proceed on a case-by-case basis to reach a tailor-
made deal with each participating locality.  
 
The government set a deadline of 4th September 2015 for submissions to be considered and a 
total of 38 bids were submitted (DCLG, 2015). The data presented in this article focusses on 
the process of negotiating these deals and appraising the deal making process in key Whitehall 
departments. This article will not discuss the details of individual localities or specific deals as 
this could jeopardize confidentiality agreements. Instead, it will identify patterns of responses 
in the beliefs, perceptions and behaviors of senior Whitehall officials. To date eight areas in 
England have secured a devolution deal and seven have a directly elected mayor in place (Table 
1). The North of Tyne deal has been the area to most recently negotiate its deal and held its 
mayoral election in May 2019. 
 
Table 1: Areas in England with a devolution deal  
Areas with a deal Most recent agreement 
Cambridge and Peterborough 
 
June 2016 
Greater Manchester  
 
March 2016 
Liverpool City Region 
 
March 2016 
North of Tyne 
 
November 2018/Mayoral election 
in May 2019 






West Midlands  
 
November 2015 
West of England 
 
March 2016 
                            Source: Author’s own 
 
 
Sandford (2016, 18) describes the devolution deals as, ‘consisting of a menu with specials. A 
number of items have been made available to most areas, but each deal also contains a few 
unique elements or specials’. Many of the deals so far cover areas such as further education, 
business support, unemployment services, EU Structural Funds, fiscal powers, integrated 
transport plans, local planning and land use. However, there is differentiation. For example, 
because of its history of productive local partnership working, the Greater Manchester 
Combined Authority is viewed by Government as the model of best practice regards the deals. 
It has, therefore, been granted control over policy areas not previously devolved in England, 
including the ability to integrate health, social care and children’s services (Sandford, 2018).  
 
However, despite the initial euphoria surrounding the potential for a reimagined localism, many 
commentators have expressed concerns about the ability of the current devolution deal process 
to meet key objectives, not least around democratic engagement. For example, Blunkett et al 
(2016, 553) note that ‘while each proposed deal is different, there is one thing that they all have 
in common - a lack of public consultation prior to being announced - which may present a real 
threat to this new policy taking root’. They go on to contend that:   
 
‘although the government’s devolution agenda may well offer significant opportunities 
in terms of economic growth, employment and market innovation, how will the 
“revolution in devolution” develop democratic roots so that it can take hold and be 
sustained?’ (ibid, 554). 
 
The counter argument to this is that the political momentum and secrecy behind the devolution 
deals is seen as necessary in activating change in an area of policy that was described by a 
senior local government official to ‘have limped along for years’ (Political Studies Association, 
2016, 8). Kenealy (2016, 578), in his analysis of the Greater Manchester deal, suggests that 
local actors ‘embraced the secrecy with which they have proceeded to date’. Leaders in Greater 
Manchester feared that they would lose control of a public debate and ‘not get the prize that 
they had been seeking for so many years’ (ibid, 578). This analysis suggests that democratic 
legitimacy, transparency and public scrutiny were purposefully sacrificed to drive the 
devolution agenda forward. Indeed, this is a recognized strategy in the governance literature 
and is seen as a way to move forward difficult decisions in complex network characterized by 
divisions and stalemates (Torfing et al, 2012). Nonetheless, this form of decision making has 
clearly prioritized elitist decision making over the preferences of citizens, leading Tomaney 
(2016) to describe the emerging settlement as ‘akin to the model of “post democracy”, as 
elaborated by Colin Crouch [2004], whereby formal mechanisms of accountability exist, but 
their practical role is increasingly limited and embodied in the interest of a small elite.’ While 
this may prove effective in the short term it does create problems of buy-in, public support and 
implementation challenges in the future. 
 
One explanation for this perceived shortsightedness lies in an inherent propensity for top down 
elitist control in British politics. Wills (2016, 2), for example, notes that a historical disposition 
to centralism in the UK ‘imposes on our ability to imagine other ways of organizing the state 
and enacting citizenship…growing up in a centralized polity has limited our ability to develop 
an alternative geographical imagination about the operation of political power’. Wills describes 
a path dependent pathology built into the ruling and rationalities of Westminster and Whitehall 
officials that permeates the political system. This sense of the ‘way things are done around 
here’ also impacts on the aspirations and expectations of local actors and citizens. One way of 
addressing this is to develop new ‘imaginaries’ about political decision making and to renew 
practices of democratic engagement outside Westminster (Healey, 2018). A key question for 
this article is whether informal forms of governance can be utilized as a tool to facilitate new 
imaginaries - as opposed to the widely held view that high levels of informality have led to a 
form of strategic statecraft geared towards perpetuating the top down characteristics of the 
British Political Tradition.   
 
PART III. METHODOLOGY 
 
This study adopts an in-depth qualitative methodology aimed at providing narratives about the 
day-to-day practices guiding political actions (Rhodes, 2013). This interpretivist approach has 
been selected to generate ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz, 1983) of where, how and between whom 
informal governance operates. In his study of Everyday Life in British Government (2011) 
Rhodes used storytelling to provide a compelling insight into the world of ministers and senior 
civil servants by exploring the beliefs, practices and rituals that govern everyday life. He refers 
to ‘storytelling’ as collecting individual voices and increasing the voices heard through the 
development of engaging narratives. Rhodes argues that this decentred form of inquiry has 
much to offer theoretically and methodologically by drawing attention to deeper principles of 
organization that are not visible to empiricist or positivist approaches. 
 
The empirical work is based on two rounds of interviews. The first was conducted between 
September 2015 and January 2016 with twenty-two senior Whitehall officials charged with 
negotiating devolution deals. Respondents were identified through established professional 
contacts, a search of departmental websites and snowballing. Interviews were conducted with 
officials working in the Treasury, Cabinet Office and the Departments for Business, Innovation 
and Skills (BIS); Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and Transport (DfT). 
Respondents were asked a series of questions about formal and informal procedures for 
negotiating devolution deals. These included, whether they recognized the use of informality 
in the process, their motivations for using informal governance, their perceptions on the 
advantages and disadvantages of informal working and the impact of informal governance on 
the policy process.  
 
The second round of interviews was conducted between April-June 2018 with ten Whitehall 
officials charged with managing and appraising the ongoing devolution deal process. These 
interviews were conducted with officials in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
Government (MHCLG) and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
(BEIS). It is worth noting that these departments represent a reorganization of Whitehall but 
include many of the staff positions and functions of the Departments interviewed in 2016. This 
round of interviews focused on retrospective perceptions of the deal making process, ongoing 
devolution deals and how informal working had impacted on inter-governmental relationships. 
Representing the propensity for the continual movement of senior staff in Whitehall, none of 
the ten officials interviewed in 2018 were interviewed in the first round.  
 
Undertaking two rounds of interviews at critical points in the devolution deal process has a 
number of advantages. The first round provides an opportunity for those directly involved to 
tell their own story about their rationales and motivations for using more informal ways of 
working. The second round offers scope for critical reflection on this process with the benefit 
of hindsight. This approach allows for a temporal analysis of Whitehall perceptions regards the 
use and feasibility of informal governance. Interviews were conducted under ‘Chatham House 
Rules’ and lasted between 30-70 minutes. They were digitally recorded, professionally 
transcribed and manually coded to elicit findings.  
 
This methodology has both strengths and acknowledged limitations. Generating insights 
through storytelling and narratives has allowed central government respondents to articulate 
the day-to-day activities of informal governance in their own words (Bevir and Rhodes, 2016). 
This has generated a rich and illuminating data set for exploration that complements existing 
academic work that has judged the democratic legitimacy of the devolution process from the 
perspective of local officials and non-governmental actors. Judgements have been made about 
the impact of informal governance on democratic legitimacy based on the perceptions of 
critical actors in the network. These perceptions have been supplemented by desk based 
evidence on network outcomes where possible, by triangulating empirical findings with 
observations derived from governmental and academic commentaries. This is an 
acknowledged and much used methodology in network research (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). 
The analysis presented in the article does, however, have a number of acknowledged 
weaknesses. First, it is based solely on the views and perceptions of central government 
officials. Future work might complement this analysis by looking specifically at how local 
actors and citizens have viewed the use of informal governance in the devolution process.  
 
Second, actor ‘perceptions’ of informal governance and democratic legitimacy are subjective 
and likely to ebb and flow over time. Although beyond the scope of this project, it might be 
beneficial to identify a set of metric based indicators of network outcomes (output legitimacy) 
and seek to track the impact of informal governance in achieving specific outcomes. Third, the 
sample for interviews in the second round in 2018 was not as large or as representative of a 
broader range of government departments as was planned. The looming prospect of Brexit and 
the challenges of preparing for it in a highly politicized policy environment made it difficult to 
source senior officials willing to speak about constitutional reform at that time. Nonetheless, 
these interviewees do represent individuals working at the heart of Whitehall on English 
devolution and offer an illuminating reflection of the process. Future work might seek to ensure 
a broader representation of views when (or if) policy making in Whitehall resumes to normality 
in a post Brexit world. The following section presents the findings and is structured under the 
headings of ruling, rationalities and resistance.  
 
PART IV. FINDINGS 
 
Ruling: How have historic traditions shaped the informal actions of situated agents? 
 
In this paper the tradition of the ‘Westminster Model’ is drawn upon to provide a backcloth for 
how situated actors ‘do business’. Bevir (2013, 68) states, 
 
‘British civil servants are socialized into the broad notions of the Westminster model, 
such as ministerial responsibility, as well as the specific ways of doing things around 
here. They are socialized into the idea of a profession, and they learn the framework of 
the acceptable’. 
 
In short, there is a simple chain of command. Civil servants are accountable to Ministers who 
are accountable to Parliament, whose Members are accountable to their constituents and this 
understanding shapes actions and behaviors in UK policy making (Wilson, 2016). Decentered 
theory recognizes that historic traditions help to explain practices, actions, and beliefs but also 
that actors can ‘modify traditions in response to [new] dilemmas’ (Bevir, 2013, 50). The 
dilemma in this instance was how to devolve power in a system characterized by a strong 
propensity for centralization. Institutional practices for developing devolution deals have been 
described as ‘almost entirely secret’ with details ‘being released only when agreements have 
been reached’ (Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2015, 8). However, formal procedures did exist that 
are emblematic of the Westminster tradition. Interviewees suggested that negotiations for 
devolution deals were directed by a series of formal arrangements, not least the Government’s 
manifesto, Devolution Bill, Ministerial speeches and a cross-departmental team (Cities and 
Local Growth Team) to oversee the deals. Deals were signed off via Whitehall’s Cabinet 
Committee and the relevant Minster. This formalization of informal decision making ensured 
that due (Westminster) processes were adhered to, thus satisfying minimum Whitehall 
standards for input, throughout and output legitimacy, as a DCLG officials commented, 
 
‘We are bound by a civil service code. That way of doing things must be followed but 
within that one has a degree of discretion in how to operate. Working informally or “off 
the grid” is an important aspect of the civil servants’ toolkit. The degree to which one 
draws on it is dependent on circumstance. The devolution deals are an area of policy 
where it is required. It’s appropriate and frankly it’s the only way to get the job done.’  
 
Indeed, all respondents agreed that central-local relations had been characterized as highly 
informal during the negotiations compared with previous arrangements. Officials working on 
the deals agreed that the main drive had come from a clear steer from Ministers and the contents 
of the Devolution Bill, which was broadly acknowledged to be purposefully low on guidance 
(DCLG and Home Office, 2015). Interviewees felt that a ‘window of informal opportunity’ 
(BEIS official) was opened by a constitutional entrepreneur in the form of the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, George Osborne, who was very clearly personally driving the agenda in 
conjunction with the then Minister for Communities and Local Government, Greg Clark. 
According to interviewees, both had expressed a clear preference for process light 
arrangements. However, when both Ministers left their respective posts in July 2016 the 
environment for doing business changed. A senior official from the Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) reflected in 2018 that the ‘era of permissive 
informality is perhaps less evident than it was at the start of the devolution deal process’. 
Another official in the same department opined,  
 
‘We are in a different world to the height of Osborne and Clark-ism. That era was one 
of experimentation, characterized by a high degree of flexibility and discretion in how 
we managed central-local relationships. It was also driven by a clear ministerial agenda 
to devolve power where the best case was made locally’.  
 
Respondents agreed that the emphasis on bespoke and individually brokered deals had removed 
some of the constraints about spatial consistency that had blighted English devolution in the 
past. This contractual style of deal making has led Sandford (2017, 63) to conclude that the 
devolution deals cannot be appraised ‘by conventional governance criteria: accountability, 
transparency and the quality of governance systems’ as they were never designed to meet these 
criteria. Indeed, a clear Ministerial steer provided the legitimacy for civil servants to work more 
informally and differentially. As one BEIS official noted, ‘Ministerial approval was the green 
light for us to push the boundaries and approach our relationships with localities in what might 
be seen as an unorthodox way for Whitehall’.  
 
As a consequence, what emerged was a group of highly skilled senior civil servants, linked by 
an increasingly dense and more frequent layer of informal relationships. They were involved 
in high level negotiations and had senior positions within their respective departments, making 
them ideally placed to use informal processes, as a DCLG official described,  
 
‘I’m a true civil servant to Greg Clark. I really dislike formalized processes. We had 
what we needed to make devolution happen, which was a wealth of ideas generated 
from discussions between central and local actors, political momentum and clear 
articulation from the Chancellor and Greg Clark that they wanted to do this. It was the 
perfect timing and the right set of conditions to make things happen in a way that was 
not possible before’.  
 
Mukherjee and Giest (2019) suggest that in complex and uncertain environments, policy 
entrepreneurs need to balance their managerial expertise and political acumen if they are to 
secure policy outcomes. They refer to this as ‘uncertainty mitigating capacity’ (ibid, 1). Faced 
with a new ‘dilemma’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2016) of how to devolve power in a system with a 
disposition to centralism, key policy entrepreneurs in Whitehall and Westminster turned to 
informality to overcome some of the institutional barriers. For example, inter-personal 
relationships were used to create an innovative space by brining reluctant actors into 
discussions. A number of interviewees referred to ‘building trust as essential in driving forward 
difficult decisions’ (Treasury official). These insights provide evidence for the two components 
associated with throughput legitimacy (Kleine, 2018) - first, a degree of accountability in the 
system and second, legitimation based on the pursuit of effective decision making to achieve 
strategic priorities. However, this form of accountability is emblematic of Stoker’s (2018) 
criticism of governance networks that focus on internal accountability within the system at the 
expense of external forms of accountability to the people. Indeed this lack of visibility and 
uncoupling from the democratic circuit (Papadopoulos, 2007) undermines broader forms of 
democratic anchorage (Sorensen and Torfing, 2018) and legitimacy.  
 
Interestingly, by 2018 the Ministers and many of the civil servants had been replaced and a 
reassertion of more traditional forms of inter-governmental relationships reemerged. An 
official in MHCLG commented,  
 
‘We are still a place in Whitehall that gets things done…But our activities are shaped 
more now by a formal institutional context so we are less of a maverick brigade. The 
deal making process was a moment in time, appropriate to task. Now there is a little 
more hierarchy and structure’.  
 
This comment indicates that, without political momentum and the entrepreneurial tendencies 
of ‘maverick’ Ministers and their dutiful civil servants, the path dependent ‘ruling’ tendencies 
(Bevir, 2013) of Whitehall have returned to order.   
 
Rationalities: How have scientific beliefs and knowledge shaped the informal actions of 
situated agents? 
 
This article draws upon a number of rationalities that have shaped decision making around 
English devolution. The first is a growing body of evidence that claims that decentralization 
can boost economic productivity and growth (Hooghe et al, 2016). This is purported to be the 
UK Government’s motive for the devolution deals, as a MHCLG official stated, ‘there was a 
philosophical drive towards devolving power that led to a political drive to devolve power’. 
Second, a strategy of ‘unashamed diversity’ was accepted in Whitehall as different deals were 
brokered across England. In short, it was not deemed necessary to include all areas in the 
initiative (Lupton et al, 2018). However, this rationality clashes with arguments from local 
actors and commentators that devolution should include ‘the forgotten areas’ - including rural 
and coastal towns - if spatial equity and social justice is to be maintained (Jennings et al, 2017).  
 
In 2016 Whitehall officials referred to a government genuinely committed to devolution, which 
was seen ‘in stark contrast to efforts under previous governments’ (DCLG official). In response 
to managing the ‘dilemma’ (Bevir, 2013) of English devolution, Whitehall officials had 
modified their actions to produce new patterns of public action. Pivotal to this was the idea (or 
rationality) that devolution can assist with economic growth and productivity - a narrative 
particularly appealing in an era of austerity. Taking a reflexive view, a BEIS official opined,  
 
‘You didn’t have a detailed process, but you had two things. One was a real willingness 
centrally for senior people to meet with local areas to get serious about devolving 
power. The second were deadlines set high up that had to be met. That was the driving 
force at the time.’  
 
 
While the momentum and deadlines proved advantageous for those areas with ‘first mover 
advantage’ (BEIS official) - leading to throughput and output legitimacy for some - other areas 
without the capacity to move quickly or those without established links into Whitehall were 
sidelined, undermining input legitimacy. 
 
Indeed, Whitehall faced a particular challenge in developing high quality and inter-personal 
relationships with all localities due to huge variations in institutional arrangements and local 
governance capacity. Recent research by the Political Studies Association (2016) suggests that 
Whitehall has its ‘preferred’ places to work with. The Greater Manchester conurbation was 
often referred to as ‘the best practice model…a lot of political energy and time have been 
devoted within Whitehall to develop devolution there’ (HM Treasury official). However, other 
localities in England did not have the same history of local partnership working or the positive 
relationships with the Centre to cultivate devolution in the same way. Moreover, the Centre did 
not have the human resources to invest equally in other local areas. This resulted in a high 
degree of differentiation in both the process (throughput legitimacy) governing central-local 
relations and the outcomes (output legitimacy) in term of devolution agreements, raising 
questions about spatial equity and social justice in the system (Sandford, 2017).  
 
This situation chimes with Borzel and Panke’s (2012) argument that it is often hard to balance 
efficient decision making and inclusiveness in governance networks. Indeed, in this case 
central government officials appeared to prioritize throughput and output legitimacy over input 
legitimacy as a source of legitimation. Getting the job done and making difficult decisions in 
key areas was prioritized over the inclusion of all areas and the public, leading a MHCLG 
official to comment in April 2018, ‘one wonders if the process had been more formal if some 
of the difficult discussions would have been resolved and some of the failed bids would have 
survived’. While informality proved effective for some, it was clearly not for others, suggesting 
a degree of variability in meeting Kleine’s (2018) three dimensions of democratic legitimacy. 
Moreover, a BEIS official reflected that ‘the devolution negotiations were bruising encounters 
for some and we want to get away from that’. The solution for this official at least has been to 






Resistance: How has central and local resistance shaped the informal actions of situated 
agents?  
 
Resistance to devolution can be found horizontally between different elites in Whitehall and 
vertically between central and local actors. For example, Whitehall departments have variable 
levels of enthusiasm for decentralization, which has prevented a coherent approach to 
devolving power in the past (Ayres and Stafford, 2014). Research evidence indicates that this 
disposition is enduring, reflective of the ruling traditions of the system (Bevir, 2013). Indeed, 
there was a perception amongst a number of respondents that the big delivery departments - 
health, education and welfare - ‘remain quietly cautious about decentralizing budgets and 
functions locally and this has led to resistance between those supportive of devolution and 
those who are not’ (DCLG official).  
 
This variation in Whitehall commitment was a key element shaping the deal process. Informal 
negotiations were viewed by Whitehall officials as effective in helping to resolve some of these 
horizontal tensions - promoting throughput legitimacy and input legitimacy. A HM Treasury 
official indicated that ‘informal discussions about devolution between departments were often 
more productive as you can leave some of the politics at the door and explore possibilities that 
you might not be able to formally’. This supports Christiensen et al’s (2013) finding that 
informality promotes deliberation between elites. However, the ‘silo’ mentality of Whitehall 
often proved persistent with commitment ebbing and flowing over time. More recently, a 
MHCLG official noted that the task of persuading reluctant departments to get involved had 
been made more challenging due to the fact this ‘this Prime Minister is not as pro devolution 
as her predecessor so devolution for devolution’s sake is no longer on the agenda’. This 
demonstrates how the formal state apparatus - or institutional Westminster resilience - 
significantly shaped the environment for doing business (Diamond, 2019). The first round of 
devolution deals in 2015 were shaped by a very particular set of factors that made a high degree 
of informality possible - i.e. a new and challenging ‘dilemma’, strong political momentum, 
looming timescales, maverick elected leaders and willing civil servants. Without this 
combination of factors, the propensity for informality and innovation in the system has waned.   
 
With regards vertical resistance, the rationale behind devolution is often purported to be about 
bringing decision making closer to the people. Nonetheless, this is at odds with the devolution 
deal process itself, which has been criticized as top town, elitist and exclusionary (Prosser et 
al, 2017). For a policy that concerns the relationship between governors and the governed, this 
disjuncture has demonstrably jarred with local stakeholders and public opinion. Indeed, 
mechanisms through which relevant stakeholders or the public could hold decision makers to 
account were noticeable by their absence. The devolution deal process served to highlight that 
informal governance can also exclude groups from decision making - undermining input, 
throughput and outputs legitimacy. Bailey et al (2015) suggest that many local stakeholders 
felt ignored by the process, leaving them feeling ill-informed and disconnected from decisions. 
Members of the public were, not surprisingly, far less impressed with a process that operated 
through a set of informal, secretive, elite-to-elite relationships.  
 
Indeed, few attempts were made either to engage the public directly or to assert that the new 
structures would improve democratic engagement. A process of deliberation should include 
interested parties affected by the decisions (Kleine, 2018) but in the case of the devolution 
deals this did not happen. Only a handful of local leaders have participated in deal negotiations, 
with no information becoming available to other stakeholders until the deal was concluded and 
published (Tomaney, 2016). The small number of local representative were viewed by 
government ‘as adequate in representing the interests of affected local areas’ (BIS official), 
although clearly local stakeholders did not agree. At the time of negotiating the deals, Whitehall 
officials indicated strongly that broader consultation and engagement would have been a real 
challenge given the timescales, political sensitivities of the bids and the speed of developments. 
In essence they felt it would have undermined throughput and output legitimacy - a position 
confirmed by a number of local government and non-governmental insiders involved in the 
deal making process in research conducted by Kenealy (2016) and the Political Studies 
Association (2016). Central government respondents on the whole felt that ‘elected Council 
Leaders should lead the local negotiation process’ (BIS official). The same official went on to 
say, 
 
‘We feel that we are in quite a permissive place without there being a prescriptive set 
of things that stakeholders want. This has allowed us to explore imaginative outcomes. 
But, this is about devolution so it needs to be driven by what local people want. But, 
it’s the job of local leaders to get that right, not ours’.  
 
 
The problem of this approach was acknowledged by a BEIS official in 2018 who described the 
Government’s approach to engaging the public as ‘cavalier’. He went on to state that ‘we cared 
more about getting mayors in places and doing the deals than galvanizing public support’. The 
point was made that if the Government wants to create the appetite for further devolution then 
public perceptions of a lack of input legitimacy will need to be resolved.  
 
PART V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article has examined how the decentred aspects of ruling, rationalities and resistance have 
shaped the governance network associated with English devolution policy. It has examined 
how a series of contingent factors have shaped the informal behaviors of situated central 
government actors by combining a decentred analysis with Kleine’s (2018) criteria of input, 
throughput and output legitimacy. A number of key observations are made: 
 
First, the historical and enduring legacy of the Westminster model undoubtedly shaped the 
ruling of senior civil servants charged with managing devolution (Diamond, 2019). High 
profile Ministers were instrumental in shaping the scope and direction of the policy and for 
sanctioning civil servants to go ‘off script’ and adopt more informal and relational approaches 
to managing central-local relationships. Situated actors had the capacity to shape their own 
environments in response to a new dilemma to momentarily change the traditional working 
practices of the system. Clear lines of accountability to Ministers provide a source of 
throughput legitimacy in the system - which is one of Kleine’s (2018) components for this type 
of legitimation. Nonetheless, accountability to democratic bodies outside the core elite of 
decision makers was left wanting, raising questions about the longevity and sustainability of 
the devolution project (Blunkett et al, 2017). This issue was acknowledged by Whitehall 
officials charged with appraising the deal process in 2018, leading to the possibility of 
promoting greater accountability to external actors in the future. Indeed, those charged with 
future negotiations will be operating in a political environment where the devolution ‘genie is 
out of the bottle’ (Cox, 2016, 565). Greater public consultation may, therefore, be in their gift 
in a way that was not possible for their counterparts in 2015 who faced a huge hurdle in simple 
getting the agenda started.    
 
A second component of Kleine’s throughput legitimacy is the quality of the decision-making 
process. Here to there is evidence of legitimation. More informal ways of working were 
generally viewed as highly productive by those involved in both promoting deliberation 
between critical actors horizontally and vertically. Evidence shows that informal decision 
making has not undermined the formal rules of the Westminster system. To some extent is has 
complimented it by managing a high degree of complexity and uncertainty and securing 
progress in an area of policy historically prone to shortcomings. Given these outcomes, the 
policy has performed reasonably well across Kleine’s (2018) criteria for throughput legitimacy.   
 
Second, senior Ministers also played a central role in cultivating and promoting a narrative (or 
rationality) around the benefits of devolution. This served to galvanize political energy and 
enthusiasm across parts of Whitehall and in some local territories. Inter-personal and relational 
approaches were viewed as an effective form of statecraft (Ayres et al, 2018) to implement this 
agenda. However, concerns about a lack of parity in both opportunity and outcome across local 
areas was seen to undermine spatial equity and social justice. Moreover, not all localities were 
afforded equal opportunity for quality deliberation with the center, leading to local winners and 
losers (Lupton et al, 2018). This aspect undermines claims of universal throughput legitimacy 
and impacts on output legitimacy in some parts of England. Indeed, these findings echo work 
on informal governance at an international (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004) and European level 
(Christiensen et al, 2003) that show that informal governance is particularly effective for 
promoting innovation and creativity in the short term. However, without mechanisms of 
transparency and accountability, effective policy making is hard to maintain over the long term 
as critical partners become disillusioned with the process.    
 
Third, while informality was viewed as useful in beginning to address Whitehall’s propensity 
for centralism and promoting innovation in central-local relations, it seems that the ‘backcloth’ 
(Bevir, 2013) of a silo and centralized mentality was too strong in persuading all departments 
to devolve power. While deliberation may have improved across departments in general, an 
informal approach to negotiations has not delivered in terms of overcoming the formal 
resistance in parts of Whitehall to devolution. On the one hand, traditional democratic theorists 
(Klike, 2016) will be heartened by the fact that informal governance was ineffective in 
undermining more traditional, formal positions, structures and processes. On the other, the 
inability to orchestrate a joined-up and coherent approach to English devolution undermines 
the output legitimacy of the policy. Indeed, this remains an almost predictable, path dependent 
feature of constitutional reform in the UK, underlining the influence of historical tendencies in 
contemporary policy making and the challenges in creating new ‘imaginaries’ for localism 
(Healey, 2019). The evidence presented here shows that ruling tendencies revert to type once 
unorthodox mavericks motivated by innovative rationalities are replaced by ‘business as usual’ 
politics.    
 
Finally, arguably the biggest democratic issue to resolve are the high levels of public mistrust 
and apathy for English devolution (Prosser et al, 2017). Indeed, negotiations behind closed 
doors perpetuated feelings of alienation, undermining input legitimacy. Stoker (2019) suggests 
one way to resolve this dilemma is for governance networks to respond ‘more politically’. 
Instead of escaping into technical statecraft, governance networks need to bring the politics 
and political tension to the fore to reignite citizens’ sense of belonging and engagement. 
However, in a policy area as turbulent and conflictual as English devolution this could be a 
risky strategy - but perhaps one worth taking if a lack of public support looks to derail the 
agenda in the future. Findings do show, however, evidence of a repositioning of government 
thinking on this, which could serve to address resistance by some local stakeholders and 
citizens to the policy. This resistance threatens to undermine the implementation and ultimate 
success of the deals in some areas, making it harder to demonstrate output legitimacy in some 
areas.  
 
This article has presented a decentred and more nuanced evaluation of the democratic 
credentials of recent initiatives to promote English devolution. It complements existing work 
that has been largely critical of the democratic legitimacy of the process. A decentred analysis 
has revealed shortcomings, most notably in the failure to engage the public and the highly 
differentiated approach to devolution across England. However, as Sandford (2017) notes, it is 
unfair to judge a policy against credentials it was never designed to achieve. Research findings 
show that due Westminster process was the driving force behind the initiative and that central 
government actors sought legitimation through clear lines of accountability to Ministers, 
quality deliberation and securing outcomes. While this provides evidence of legitimation for 
Kleine (2018), other governance scholars champion a more comprehensive approach to citizen 
engagement, even when faced with the difficulties of managing complex networks (Sorensen 
and Torfing, 2018; Papadopalous, 2017). The challenge for politicians and policy makers 
moving forward is to harness the positive aspects of informality, while seeking to redress some 
of the negative aspects identified in this decentred analysis. The argument made here is that a 
decentred understanding of the way that informal governance operates can provide critical 
insights into providing assurances of democratic legitimacy in more nuanced ways than that 
traditionally offered by mainstream democratic theory.  
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